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Abstract 
Despite starting from a highly fragmentary development policy system, a considerable consensus on 
policy norms for effective development cooperation has become prevalent on the EU level. This 
consensus makes claims about the EU’s role in European development cooperation. This role 
embraces the EU’s active promotion of approximation and convergence of European policies on aid 
and development cooperation, the EU’s so called “federating role”. The purpose of this paper is to 
propose a theoretically-informed model for understanding institutional dynamics in European 
development cooperation in terms of competing ideas and discourses on the EU’s role in regard to 
national aid policies. After clarifying the theoretical background and main concepts, the paper has 
provided, first, a long term narrative of institutional dynamics in EU development cooperation and, 
second, a close-up illustration for the period between 2009 and 2012. Following from this, the paper 
proposes an agency-oriented, discursive institutionalist perspective which stresses the role of policy 
entrepreneurs and epistemic communities in challenging and perpetuating obstacles to institutional 
change in EU development cooperation. 
 
Key Words: Discursive institutionalism, European integration, development cooperation, aid 
effectiveness, harmonisation 
 
                                                          
1 I would like to thank Geoffrey Edwards and Molly Krasnodębska for their valuable comments and critique. All 
errors are my own. 
2 
 
Introduction 
Despite starting from a highly fragmentary development policy system, a considerable consensus on 
policy norms for effective development cooperation has become prevalent on the EU level. This 
consensus has been enshrined in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the European Consensus on 
Development (2005) and consecutive, non-legislative initiatives. It is also reflected in the EU’s 
contribution to the international aid effectiveness agenda since the early/mid-2000s (Carbone 2007, 
2010, 2013a; Farrell 2008; Holland 2008; Holland and Doidge 2012; Grimm et al 2012). This 
consensus makes claims about the EU’s role in European development cooperation. This role 
embraces the EU’s active promotion of approximation and convergence of European policies on aid 
and development cooperation without resorting to central pooling of resources and competences. 
Some observers have called it the EU’s “federating role” (OECD-DAC 2007, 12; 2012; Corre 2009; 
Orbie and Versluys 2008). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to propose a model for understanding institutional dynamics in 
European development cooperation in terms of competing ideas and discourses on the EU’s role in 
regard to national aid policies. This paper approaches this task in three steps. First, it briefly clarifies 
the theoretical background and main concepts. This section largely draws on insights from discursive 
institutionalism (see Schmidt 2008, 2010) which provides a role for ideas in understanding change 
and continuity in EU institutional dynamics through interactive processes of discourse. The second 
section considers how competing ideas of the EU’s role in development cooperation have evolved 
and contribute to the understanding of institutional dynamics over the long term. This evaluates the 
value added of the theoretical approach for the analysis of EU development cooperation. It 
scrutinises the historical emergence, competition and manifestation of different ideas about the 
function of the EU in development cooperation and connects them to institutional developments. In 
particular, it shows how the established “logic of diversity”, which had long obstructed EU aid 
harmonisation, has been challenged to give rise to the EU’s “federating role” by referring to a “logic 
of effectiveness”, i.e. increasing Europe’s collective effectiveness in terms of developmental goals, 
especially poverty reduction. In this process, the Commission has actively sought legitimacy for this 
role in previous initiatives and international agreements, and the endorsement by stakeholders and 
experts in recipient countries, NGOs and think tanks. 
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The third section provides an illustration of this model for EU development cooperation 
between 2009 and 2012. Actors, especially in the Commission and backed by NGOs and think tanks, 
have continued to promote the approximation of EU donor activities against the background of 
various political crises in Europe since the late 2000s (Mackie 2013; Klingebiel et al 2014; Fejerskov 
and Keijzer 2013; CONCORD 2012, 9). As a result of the financial and economic crisis of 2008 and the 
ongoing Eurozone crisis, budgetary pressures increased the preoccupation with national priorities, 
popular confidence in European integration declined, and mutual distrust between the institutions 
and member states increased. These debates about the future of European integration have been 
complemented by renewed challenges to the EU’s role in the world over responses to the 
neighbourhood around the Arab Spring, as epitomised in the response to the crisis in Libya. These 
crises have substantially changed the environment in which EU-level discourses about European 
integration and the EU’s role in the world take place (see Schmidt 2012). This section traces the 
discursive processes for that episode to demonstrate how ideas are tied to action. It builds on OECD-
DAC peer reviews, the European Commission’s annual reports on the EU’s development and external 
assistance policies, and various NGO/think tank reports on aid coordination, which are 
complemented by member state perspectives where applicable. 
 
 
 
Ideas, Discourse and Institutional Dynamics 
The presented analytical framework contributes to the understanding of institutional dynamics in the 
EU in terms of agents’ competing ideas about the role of the EU in European development 
cooperation. This is based on the perspective that ideas contribute to the construction of the EU 
polity (Jachtenfuchs et al 1998) in that they can change or perpetuate institutional dynamics through 
discourse (Diez 1999, 2001). This framework largely draws on Vivien Schmidt’s work on ‘discursive 
institutionalism’ (Schmidt 2008, 2010) which complements the “new” institutionalist approaches, i.e. 
historical, rational choice and sociological institutionalism. It provides an agency-oriented framework 
of how to understand processes of discursive construction about the EU from within the EU’s 
institutional context. 
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On the level of theory, the framework draws on social constructivism. It starts from the 
premise that human agents do not exist independently from their social context with its collectively 
shared, intersubjectively constructed and reproduced systems of meaning-making (see Wendt 1987). 
The social constructs which influence actors’ perception of the world can be both constraining or 
enabling. Following Giddens (1984), agents and social structures can be seen as mutual constitutive. 
Institutions, broadly defined, are social structures which provide agents with complex 
understandings of their interests and identities (Checkel 1999, 2005; Egeberg 1999). In this sense, EU 
policy actors may be constrained in their choices of potential action by previous EU level discourses. 
This structuralist approach to discourse has been criticised for overlooking the creation of meaning 
(see Diez 2001). To avoid this structuralist fallacy, Diez (2001), among others, highlights the 
intersubjective construction of meaning by actors through discourse. It is through discourse that 
practice, ideas and norms become institutionalised and are reproduced in a given institutional 
context. Thus, discourses provide actors with a way to change the existing structures, norms and 
institutions. Compared to the traditional “new” institutionalist approaches, which tend to stress the 
constraints on agents, actors retain some freedom in the construction of their ideas and the 
articulation of their discourse (Schmidt 2012). Hence, discursive institutionalism provides a way of 
thinking about how agents promote ideas for changing or perpetuating institutional dynamics from 
within. 
 
Diez (1999, 2001) suggests ways of including the analysis of intersubjective meaning-making 
in the study of institutional dynamics in the EU by focusing on agents’ discursive action. Discursive 
institutionalism regards subjective interests, institutions and social norms as background knowledge 
of agents (Schmidt 2008). Agents challenge or perpetuate these existing norms and institutions by 
relying on what Schmidt (2008) calls “foreground discursive abilities” based on a “logic of 
communication” or a “logic of arguing” (Risse 2000) based on the communicative action of Habermas 
(1981). In this understanding actors are able to challenge validity claims in causal or normative ideas 
through discursive action. Discursive action involves more than the content of discourse, i.e. its ideas, 
words or “text”, but includes the context and processes in which this content is structured (how, 
who, why, when, where and to whom). Actors structure a discourse to legitimise their ideas both 
cognitively and normatively by processes of argumentation, deliberation, and persuasion. This logic 
requires a degree of argumentative rationality, i.e. assuming that interests, preferences and identity 
of agents are not completely fixed. This involves that actors are goal-oriented, but they are open to 
be persuaded.  
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In the multi-level institutional structure of the EU actors engage in a “coordinative” discourse 
of elite policy construction at the EU level and a “communicative” discourse with the wider public 
involving national level discussion, contestation and legitimisation (Schmidt 2012). The discourse 
about the EU’s role in development cooperation hardly enters the wider political arena. Hence, 
discursive action takes place primarily between individuals and groups at the centre of policy 
construction who seek to coordinate agreement on policy ideas among themselves (Schmidt 2008; 
Tomic 2013). These are actors within the EU institutions in the narrow sense of the formal 
understanding of organisations responsible for identifying issues, setting the agenda and framing 
policy ideas. The different institutions have different roles and degrees of formal influence, but they 
should not been seen as monolithic. The Commission, precisely DG DEVCO, fulfils the role of a “policy 
entrepreneur” (see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) serving as catalysts in that it plays an important role 
in articulating and promoting ideas. Member states are neither monolithic actors, nor necessarily 
antagonised to the supranational institutions. They play a central role in agenda-setting and 
coordination through their staff in the Council and its working groups, and since 2009 increasingly in 
the European External Action Service (EEAS). Especially the engagement of diplomatic in contrast to 
development staff (usually working group level) changes how they engage in the discourse about the 
EU’s role. The European Parliament has limited formal functions in development cooperation, but it 
is an active public communicator and maintains policy networks. 
 
However, the set of actors involved in the construction, elaboration, and justification of 
policies is not restricted to bureaucrats, civil servants and elected officials in the Commission, the 
Council, the EEAS, and the European Parliament, but it involves experts, organised interests, and 
activists. These actors, who share principled normative and causal beliefs about a common policy 
enterprise, connect through “epistemic communities” which become a central element of 
understanding how ideas inform institutional dynamics. Following Haas (1992, 27), “epistemic 
communities are channels through which new ideas circulate from societies to governments as well 
as from country to country”. Their role in terms of conceptualising linkages between the EU and the 
national level is complex and yet underdeveloped which is also true for third country and 
international actors, e.g. international organisations and third country actors. The institutionalisation 
of the relationship between the EU and the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) 
provides a way of co-opting stakeholders into the process of constructing a role of the EU in 
development cooperation. Policy entrepreneurs, especially from the Commission, seek ‘allies’ to 
legitimise their ideas as they draw on expertise and knowledge construction from think tanks, NGOs 
and stakeholders. Co-opting an epistemic community into formal institutions “lays the groundwork 
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for a broader acceptance of the community’s beliefs and ideas about the proper construction of 
social reality” (Haas 1992, 27). Epistemic communities are not passive actors. They seek ways to 
promote their ideas as advocacy coalitions, transcend boundaries of formal institutions, and become 
themselves part of the institutional dynamics. Crucially, these “less visible” institutional structures, 
which simultaneously play a role on the EU level and the national level, have a central position in the 
discursive institutionalist perspective. 
 
 
Competing Discourses on Aid Integration 
Competing ideas about the role of “Europe” in development cooperation have been structured over 
the history of common aid policies along a logic of diversity and a logic of effectiveness. A useful 
starting point is the work of Hoffmann (1966) on the obstacles to European integration in the high 
politics of foreign policy. In a nutshell, Hoffmann argues that the obstacles to integration primarily lie 
in the differences in member states’ “national situations” which consist of domestic politics and 
institutional systems, and the external identities and interests determined by geography and history. 
Interaction among the member states on issues of relations with the international system exacerbate 
these tensions and reproduce the differences. That is what he calls the “logic of diversity” which 
contests the functional “logic of integration” set up by Monnet and originally analysed by Haas, 
subsuming the attraction of the regional integrationist forces (Hoffmann 1966, 881). In development 
cooperation this logic of integration has been framed in terms of effectiveness, first in the early 
1970s, and has been subsequently framed as a “logic of effectiveness”. However, the logic of 
diversity manifested already during the first steps towards supranationalising development 
cooperation in Europe in the late 1950s. Path dependency plays a significant role. As one logic was 
established, it has constrained agents’ ability to challenge it, but only to a certain degree. This 
challenges institutionalist accounts which assume a rigid corset of historical precedents in line with 
the discursive institutionalist perspective that structures, including discourses, constrain agents only 
to a certain extent but allow them to challenge structures from within. 
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Manifestation of the Logic of Diversity 
In May 1950, in his famous declaration, Robert Schuman asserted that through the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) “Europe will be able to pursue the achievement of one of its essential 
tasks, namely, the development of the African continent”2. Connecting European integration and 
African development established two crucial precedents defining the process of aid integration in 
Europe. First, the declaration asserted a role in development cooperation to the Community 
institutions despite the Eurocentric focus of the ECSC. Second, the declaration made a provision for 
the purpose of integration in the area of development cooperation, i.e. the (economic and social) 
development of Africa, which was based on French colonial legacy. For France, the creation of a Eur-
African Community through its late-colonial, developmentalist policy of association had been central 
to its post-war identity and interests, and its continuation through Europe became a national 
imperative (Claeys 2004; Dimier 2014). 
 
Due to the French insistence, both ideas characterised the institutionalisation of association 
on the level of the Community in the late 1950s. However, the French model met strong resistance 
from some of the prospective EEC members, especially the Netherlands and Germany. Both 
countries assumed a globalist position with a commercially oriented development policy, rejecting a 
colonial, discriminatory regional trade regime (Cosgrove Twitchett 1978). Although both countries 
conceded to secure France’s approval for European integration, their resistance established the logic 
of diversity in development cooperation obstructing further integration in this area after 1958. This 
logic was largely manifested with the return of de Gaulle and decolonisation. The independence of 
former dependencies weakened France’s ambition to promote social and economic development of 
its former dependencies (Shepard 2006). France shifted its national focus to political rather than 
developmental affairs in Africa. Community policy, however, represented by the Commission, 
showed a large degree of continuity from the status quo ante, as Commission officials were able to 
maintain African leaders’ support for continuing the original relationship in the post-colonial era 
(Cosgrove Twitchett 1978). Subsequently, development policies of the Western European countries 
and the Community developed in parallel. 
 
 
                                                          
2 For an English version of Robert Schuman’s speech see, for example, http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-
information/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration/index_en.htm [23.02.2015]. 
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In the early 1970s, from within the Commission, there were attempts to promote a different 
idea about the role of the Community based on the logic of effectiveness. With Britain’s accession to 
the EC looming and trying to capitalise on the changes in the international political economy since 
1968 (Ravenhill 1985; Garavini 2012), the Commission embarked on a policy of intra-Community aid 
harmonisation. As a reaction to increasing pressure from European civil society and recipient 
countries, in 1971 and 1972 the Commission issued two Communications arguing that steps towards 
political integration in development cooperation were “made necessary by the problem of relations 
between an enlarged Community and the developing countries” (Commission of the European 
Communities 1972, 3). The Commission, for the first time, explicitly connected diversity of European 
aid policies with the lack of effectiveness of aid. It suggested that the  
“lack of harmonisation in the various aids applied to the same developing countries or regions results 
in a definite reduction in the effectiveness of the aid because it is quite clear that the assistance is only 
completely effective if its implementation follows the same aims and by convergent methods.” 
(Commission of the European Communities 1972, 20, emphasis added) 
The Commission’s proposals aimed at decentralised harmonisation of member states’ and 
Community policies, including common operating frameworks for the programming of aid, 
conditionality, untying of aid, and information sharing. This flags the emergence of a different role 
for the Community institutions in development cooperation. Despite its efforts, however, the 
Commission failed to convince globalist-minded member states, especially the Netherlands and 
Germany, which rejected approximation of their policies along the Commission’s predominantly 
regionalist lines and interpreted it primarily as a claim for power (Grilli 1993, 81-2). 
 
Consequently, the Commission focussed on its characteristic of being seen internationally as 
a distinct actor from member states. In Lomé, the Commission capitalised on the path dependency of 
the logic of diversity. UK accession provided a window of opportunity of adjusting EC development 
policy given Britain’s sense of identity and interests in development. Thus, before Britain joined, a 
compromise had to be found between the regionalist position advocated by France and the 
Commission, and the globalists, joined by the UK (Cosgrove Twitchett 1981; Ravenhill 1985). 
Although the more globalist-minded member states were partially successful in opening up the 
Community’s policy, the Commission, dominated by regionalists, continued to insist on the EC’s 
regionalist approach and deferred the formulation of a global development policy (Grilli 1993, 67). As 
a result, the first Lomé Convention of 1975 was built on the previous, particularistic tradition of 
common development cooperation and portrayed in terms of a progressive, ‘European’ post-colonial 
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identity which turned it into a model for North-South relations (Ravenhill 1985; Lister 1988; Grilli 
1993, 35; Garavini 2012, 115). However, it did not become a model for more comprehensive 
supranationalisation of development cooperation in Europe. Instead, it perpetuated the logic of 
diversity as it firmly established the Community as a distinct actor in international development. The 
Commission followed this logic even as the particularistic nature of the common development policy 
was subsequently eroded by enlargement and the global opportunity structure fostered by the US-
dominated Bretton Woods institutions (“Washington Consensus”) (Crawford 1996; Brown 2000; Arts 
2004). 
 
Challenging Diversity through the Logic of Effectiveness 
The reluctant opening to the global opportunity structure increasingly provoked the UK, the 
Netherlands, Germany and Denmark to turn away from the Community as a channel to deal with 
external development cooperation challenges (Grilli 1993). Simultaneously, from the mid-1980s 
onwards integration momentum in Europe picked up again which was accelerated by the end of the 
Cold War. Despite continuing differences of attitudes on aid coordination, there had been increasing 
recognition within the Community that a more effective EU presence in international development 
could be established if Commission and member state activities benefited from greater 
complementarity (Holland 2002, 117-8). In the run-up to the Single European Act (SEA) the 
Netherlands and Denmark, together with the European Parliament, called for including aid in the 
renewed integration agenda. The discourse on aid integration experienced a significant turn with the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) signed in Maastricht in 1992 which would lead to the assertion of 
the logic of effectiveness through a Community mandate in development cooperation. The 
competences were ‘shared’ between the level of the Community and the member states. This meant 
that a single EU structure for development cooperation on the supranational Community level was 
created in parallel to member states’ national development policies. 
 
In order to increase effectiveness, the Treaty obliged all EU development policies to abide to 
the principle of complementarity. It established a Community mandate to ensure complementarity 
and the Commission was assigned to promote it (European Communities 1992; Loquai 1996). The 
interpretation of complementarity, however, created disagreement between the Commission and 
member states. The new competences tempted the Commission to strive to promote “a sort of 
functional integration” (Carbone 2013a, 345). Connecting a lack of effectiveness to the coordination 
shortfall between the EU level and the member states, the Commission suggested in its “Horizon 
10 
 
2000” of 1992 to move away from national development policies towards one common development 
policy (European Commission 1992, 52). The Commission framed the functional necessity in terms of 
horizontal coherence with other external policies, e.g. the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), and vertical coherence to avoid duplicating structures, to increase consistency and to reduce 
inefficiencies (European Commission 1992; Holland 2002, 114-9). The ambition of pooling 
competences, resources and authority centrally with the Commission in Brussels proved not to be 
feasible due to member states’ reluctance to cede further competences. Instead, a majority of 
member states stressed the importance and autonomy of bilateral development policy (Holland 
2002, 172; Carbone 2007, 53). The emphasis shifted away from complementarity, which the member 
states interpreted primarily as the Commission’s task, towards coordination. 
 
Although the Treaty provided the foundation, it was not until the early/mid-2000s that EU’s 
“federating role” became established though several EU-level initiatives. The upcoming international 
concern of overcoming aid fragmentation led to the OECD’s series of High Level Fora on Aid 
Effectiveness. It started with a general consensus on principles for aid effectiveness, especially 
harmonisation, outlined in a declaration in Rome in 2003. Within this context, as a reaction to its 
own aid coordination crisis (Dearden 2003) and to improve the effectiveness of European aid, the 
Commission embarked on reorienting its attempts at aid policy approximation (Carbone 2007, 31; 
2008; OECD-DAC 2012, 22). This was epitomised in the consecutive formulation of an EU consensus 
on development policy norms which goes back to the preparation for the UN Financing for 
Development conference in Monterrey, Mexico, in 2002. The EU’s Barcelona commitments of 2002 
included, inter alia, a consensus on improving aid effectiveness through a process of intra-EU 
coordination and harmonisation (European Commission 2004). This initiated a debate on the process 
of approximation of all EU development policies without challenging the existence of member states’ 
development policies. The EU’s role was identified in the run-up to the “European Consensus on 
Development”, whereby EU member states and institutions agreed on common development policy 
norms establishing the basis for all EU action in the field of development. 
 
The Commission increasingly referred to the global agenda on aid effectiveness to co-opt 
member states into policy convergence (Farrell 2008; Holland 2008). Following the Commission’s 
initiative in 2004, member states established the Ad Hoc Working Party on Harmonisation to 
coordinate their position for the Second High Level Forum in Paris in 2005 (Carbone 2007, 54). This 
process included the preparation of a “Brussels Consensus” as a European response to the 
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“Washington Consensus” of the Bretton Woods institutions (Grimm 2006) which included board civil 
society consultations. The resulting “European Consensus on Development” (European Parliament et 
al 2006) commits the EU institutions and the member states to certain norms of development 
cooperation, including a common understanding for delivering effective development cooperation 
and the requirement of political harmonisation to increase effectiveness of EU development 
cooperation. It was the first time that member states had agreed on common development policy 
norms for all European development policies (Carbone 2007, 56). The Consensus constitutes a 
political commitment, not yet an operational framework, to align all development policies within the 
EU to a “common vision” without full delegation of policy authority to the supranational level 
(Carbone 2010; Orbie 2012, 20). Further, non-legislative initiatives on “federating” the EU’s position 
on effective development cooperation were agreed with reference to the progressing international 
agenda, especially the EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy in the run-up 
to the Third High Level Forum in Accra in 2008 (Council of the European Union 2007). 
 
 
Promoting the EU’s “Federating Role” in Times of Crisis 
The “shock” at the height of the economic crisis in the second half of 2008 and 2009 paralysed 
efforts at approximating aid policies in Europe. Although the Commission insisted on further 
operationalising the overarching EU-wide agreements of the mid-2000s, especially with reference to 
adverse effect of the financial and economic crisis on developing countries (European Commission 
2010a, 2), neither member state governments nor the Council Presidency in the first half of 2009 put 
development cooperation high on the agenda. As Keijzer (2011) suggests, the financial and economic 
crisis has lowered the level of ambition among member state governments to agree on common 
positions in development cooperation. Especially at the beginning of the debt crisis, its management 
took up much attention and resources which were diverted away from the Commission’s attempts of 
enhancing harmonisation, and which led to delayed and often half-hearted implementation. In 
consequence, previous positions on aid effectiveness could not be reproduced. 
 
It was also due to the Swedish Presidency in the second half of 2009 that policy discussions 
on aid effectiveness intensified again (Keijzer 2011, 5). In November 2009 the Council adopted the EU 
Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness which further operationalised intra-EU coordination 
12 
 
through more precise provisions on the division of labour (European Commission 2010a, 6). 
However, efforts and engagement of most member states remained half-hearted. The second 
revision of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, 
especially the initiation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), diverted much attention 
(Bartelt 2012; European Commission 2011a). Although the Lisbon Treaty provides an enhanced 
mandate for coordination and joint action with and between member states, it also entails a growing 
resurgence of intergovernmentalism (Carbone 2013a, 350; Holland and Doidge 2012, 185). In order 
to promote joint action, the reallocation of competence from the Commission to the EU’s new 
diplomatic service, the EEAS, aimed at integrating development cooperation into a more 
comprehensive EU foreign policy system. This aimed at tying in member states more closely to create 
a “positive effect on the EU institutions’ ability to play a leading role in making EU-wide aid more 
effective” (OECD-DAC 2012, 79). 
 
Against this “increased intergovernmental impetus” (Holland and Doidge 2012, 77), the 
Commission was successful in safeguarding DG DEVCO’s central role in EU development cooperation. 
Beside the management of EU-level development cooperation, aid effectiveness expertise has 
remained with DG DEVCO. As a consequence, the Commission has maintained its primary vehicle for 
legitimising its role in the approximation of aid policies, although member states’ role in the 
coordination of external relations has been strengthened (Furness 2012, 77). From 2011 onwards, 
the Commission has re-engaged in promoting harmonisation initiatives based on its contribution to 
aid effectiveness. This is most visible in the Agenda for Change (AfC) (European Commission 2011d), 
endorsed by the Council in May 2012, which aimed at “Increasing the impact of EU Development 
Policy”. The AfC is meant to provide the overarching working programme for all EU development 
cooperation, including member state policies. It builds on the European Consensus on Development, 
while introducing a more flexible and differentiated approach to EU development cooperation. 
Compared to the previous policy framework, the AfC increases the profile of human rights, 
democracy promotion and good governance in addition to sustainable growth. With these changes, 
the Commission reacted to pressure from the European Parliament and some member states to take 
into consideration “many Member States’ own new orientations” (OECD-DAC 2012, 14). It further 
operationalises the division of labour through the concentration on three priority sectors per 
country. Finally, it aims at increasing intra-EU coordination and joint action with the member states, 
especially through common programming and aid modalities conducive to collective action such as 
budget support. With these suggestions, the Commission attempted to circumvent some of the 
member states’ concerns towards policy convergence. 
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The AfC builds on a broader societal perception of aid fragmentation as a problem. Observers 
within the community of development professionals in Europe have stressed the increasing need for 
promoting harmonisation as the “problem of the fragmentation and proliferation of aid agencies has 
been identified as one of the major constraints on more effective development cooperation, at both 
OECD and EU level” (CONCORD 2012, 36; see also Klingebiel et al 2014). This problem definition was 
picked up by the Commission when it stated that in Europe “Fragmentation and proliferation of aid is 
still widespread and even increasing, despite considerable recent efforts to coordinate and 
harmonise donor activities” (European Commission 2011d, 10, emphasis in original). The objective of 
reducing fragmentation of European aid significantly builds on the international discourse on aid 
effectiveness to increase its legitimacy (European Commission 2012; Galeazzi et al 2013, 42). The AfC 
also builds on previous agreements, especially division of labour, to increase its acceptance among 
member states (European Commission 2011d, 11). According to the Commission, the EU’s approach 
to the division of labour aims at increasing complementarity of EU donor contributions to improve 
aid effectiveness (European Commission 2011b, 3). Thus, it goes beyond simple coordination by 
“changing the situation by systematically reducing the number of donors in overcrowded sectors and 
increasing support for orphan sectors, making use of donors’ comparative advantages in the process 
to ensure the complementarity of their contributions.” (European Commission 2011b, 3, emphasis 
added) 
However, obstacles in the path of improving the division of labour and complementarity on the 
ground have largely remained as member states have proved to be reluctant to leave attractive 
sectors and ‘darling’ countries (European Commission 2011b, 14). 
 
The new framework offers a way of pursuing complementarity without relying on Brussels-
based arrangements, but focuses instead on decentralised governing by objectives, benchmarks and 
common norms. To improve the division of labour between EU donors, the Commission proposes the 
extension of joint programming between EU institutions and member states which “would reduce 
fragmentation and increase its impact proportionally to commitment levels” (European Commission 
2011d, 10). However, joint programming goes beyond division of labour because it aims at creating a 
“single joint programming document which should indicate the sectoral division of labour and 
financial allocations per sector and donor” (European Commission 2011d, 11, emphasis in original). 
During this process the Commission, the EEAS and member states jointly determine a development 
response strategy for a particular partner country and draft a joint country strategy document, 
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ideally replacing bilateral country strategies. In 2012, after some delay, DG DEVCO and the EEAS 
pushed for a significant expansion of joint programming with the member states for the country 
programming period of 2014 to 2020 (CONCORD 2012, 39; European Commission 2013). Whereas on 
the EU level all member states have continuously made high-level commitments to the principles of 
joint programming, on the national level many have resisted enhanced EU harmonisation in the 
name of aid effectiveness (European Commission 2011a; OECD-DAC 2012; Galeazzi et al 2013; 
Furness and Vollmer 2013; Carbone 2013a). Harmonisation in challenging areas such as joint 
modalities for delivering aid, e.g. conditionality, pooling of funds, co-financing, delegated 
cooperation, and measuring results is not necessarily part of joint programming limiting its 
contribution to policy convergence. 
 
Because of its limited impact on policy convergence, the Commission has sought to foster 
joint programming operationally with aid modalities facilitating its application, such as budget 
support, EU trust funds, delegated cooperation, blending, and a common framework for measuring 
and communicating the results of development policy (European Commission 2011d, 11; 2013, 29-
31). However, EU member states remained particularly divided on the conditions for and extent of 
budget support (CONCORD 2012, 37; Vanheukelom 2012; Faust and Koch 2014; Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands 2013). In 2008, the Commission had introduced so called ‘budget support 
contracts’ (European Commission 2008) to facilitate harmonisation with other EU donors’ budget 
support policies. Although, in principle, “the intervention logic of budget support is conducive to 
increasing the coordination among European donors” and “could therefore have contributed to a 
more coherent and harmonised European development policy” (Faust and Koch 2014, 24), the 
budget support contract has failed to overcome fundamental issues of contention. 
 
In order to increase the acceptance of its approach to budget support, the Commission’s 
original conception of budget support (see European Commission 2007) remained close to the 
technocratic design following the DAC guideline of 2005 which states that “political conditionality 
should not be specifically linked to budget support” (OECD-DAC 2005, 29). Budget support was linked 
to supporting the MDGs and more technocratic governance reforms, such as public financial 
management and accountability. This excludes direct positive leverages on democratic governance 
and leaves them to the provisions of the Cotonou Agreement, i.e. political dialogue and sanctions. 
Since the late 2000s this technocratic view has been less shared by many member states (see, for 
example, Molenaers et al 2010; Faust et al 2012). Thus, following the extension of budget support, 
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member states have become increasingly critical of the Commission’s approach. An increasing 
number of member states argued to use budget support more strongly as a framework for including 
normative aspirations and apply it more selectively, particularly as a reaction to the ‘Arab Spring’ 
which has pushed human rights and political governance higher on the agenda in the EU (Faust et al 
2012, 2-3; Vanheukelom 2012, 11). Several member states have included more political issues of 
governance in their eligibility criteria and linked budget support disbursement explicitly to 
democratic governance reforms. As a result, many EU donors scaled down budget support 
(CONCORD 2012, 37). The Commission reacted to this criticism with its 2010 Green Paper process 
about the future of budget support in which it explored the possibilities of connecting budget 
support more directly to political governance (European Commission 2010b). This resulted in the 
Communication on the future of budget support with stronger emphasis on democratic governance 
(European Commission 2011c). It obliges the Commission to open up its budget support approach to 
promote democracy, human rights and good governance more actively and rigidly, alongside the goal 
of reducing poverty (European Commission 2013, 38). 
 
Despite member states scepticism, the Commission presented joint programming and the 
political will to further harmonisation and joint action among member states as the EU’s primary 
input into the international debate on aid/development effectiveness (Council of the European 
Union 2011; OECD-DAC 2012, 79; CONCORD 2012, 38-9; Global Partnership 2014). The Commission 
has successfully mediated between the European and international level in Paris and Accra, which 
increased the acceptance of its approach among EU donors. This largely failed at the Fourth High 
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011. Busan further revealed the limits of the 
Commission’s approach towards approximation of EU aid policies. The EU’s common position at 
Busan represented “primarily an intergovernmental position taken by EU member states” (CONCORD 
2012, 17). The Commission’s position did not overcome internal divisions due to the debt crisis and 
external bilateral agendas of EU donors, which became increasingly tangible in Busan as emerging 
economies, especially China, started to become more involved (CONCORD 2012; Carbone 2013a, b; 
Smith 2013). Busan revealed how the global aid architecture has changed between the first HLF in 
Rome and the fourth HLF in Busan through the emergence of new economic powers and the 
proliferation of competing models of development cooperation which offers more choices for 
developing countries. 
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Conclusion 
This paper proposes a discursive institutionalist perspective for understanding institutional dynamics 
in EU development cooperation in terms of competing ideas and discourses on the EU’s role in 
regard to national aid policies. After clarifying the theoretical background and main concepts, the 
paper has provided, first, a long term narrative of institutional dynamics and, second, a close-up 
illustration for the period between 2009 and 2012. What conclusions can be drawn from this for the 
proposed model? 
First, the proposed model is agency-oriented, but it acknowledges the constraining effects of 
established discourses. The originally constructed discourse along a logic of diversity, which has 
dominated intuitional dynamics in EU development cooperation, has produced obstacles to 
institutional change even though the Commission has attempted to overcome them. However, the 
long term perspective challenges the rigidity of historical precedents. The constraints did not prevent 
the emergence and establishment of a competing discourse along a logic of effectiveness which 
promotes a competing idea of the role for the EU in development cooperation. 
Second, actors attempt to overcome obstacles to change or perpetuate institutional 
dynamics through discursive action. Whereas perpetuating institutional structures allows to 
capitalise on the path dependency of the established discourse of a logic of diversity, promoting 
institutional change requires challenging the validity claims inherent in this logic. To do so, actors 
have overwhelmingly relied on the international opportunity structure which has provided windows 
of opportunity to legitimise the rival discourse. This was the case in the early 1970s, and even more 
so since the early 2000s when there was an international opportunity structure favourable to the 
claims of the logic of effectiveness. In contrast, the economic crisis, the changing international aid 
architecture and challenges in the European neighbourhood since the late 2000s have significantly 
changed the discursive environment making it easier for actors to retreat to the logic of diversity. 
Third, the Commission has constantly acted as a policy entrepreneur. It has actively built on 
established EU-level initiatives and promoted international agreements such as the High Level Fora 
on Aid Effectiveness to improve the acceptance of the logic of effectiveness among member states in 
order to overcome obstacles to institutional change. Moreover, it has sought the endorsement of 
stakeholders and development professionals such as developing country leaders, NGOs, think tanks 
and international organisations. 
Fourth, there is no inherent antagonism between member states and supranational 
institutions. For a long time during the duration of the Lomé Convention, the Commission tried to 
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protect its own interests and identity in development cooperation through discursive action based on 
the logic of diversity. In contrast, the Nordic countries have significantly contributed to the 
construction of the logic of effectiveness, although they tend to be critical of the EU’s added value 
and, therefore, EU-level harmonisation. 
Fifth, neither institutions nor member states are monolithic actors. They overlap and are 
internally heterogeneous. Who and how actors are involved in the construction of a certain discourse 
depends on the level of their engagement (EU policy level or national level), as well as on their 
affiliation and social background (development or diplomatic). 
Sixth, epistemic communities of experts, activists and stakeholders are not passive structures 
which can be simply “employed” by institutions and member states to increase the legitimacy of 
certain ideas. They seek ways to promote their ideas as advocacy coalitions, transcend boundaries of 
formal institutions, and become themselves part of the institutional dynamics. They simultaneously 
influence EU institutions and member states. This linkage between the EU and the national level 
makes them central the understanding of how a discourse is perpetuated even against opposition. 
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